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FEDERALISM AND THE CONTROL OF RADIO AND TV LOTTERIES
Thomas F. Eagleton, Circuit Attorney for the
City of St. Louis, has recently completed a study
of his authority to prosecute radio and television
stations in St. Louis for the broadcast of lotteries
and programs giving information concerning
lotteries. The conclusions reached by Mr. Eagleton
are of general interest to prosecutors inasmuch as
they relate to restrictions on state control of the
content of radio and television programs by reason
of federal preemption of authority over broadcasting and federal control of interstate commerce.
"This study," Circuit Attorney Eagleton reported, "has led me to the firm conclusion that as a
state law enforcement officer, I have no jurisdiction
to prosecute a radio or television station for the
content of the programs which it broadcasts. Control of this subject has been vested exclusively in
the United States Department of Justice and the
Federal Communications Commission."
Two reasons were advanced by Mr. Eagleton in
support of this position. First, he pointed to the
Federal Communications Act of 1934 which, he
indicated, "preempted the field of regulation of
radio and television.' Section 304 of this Act expressly exerts federal authority over the broadcast of lotteries and similar schemes by making
their broadcast a federal criminal offense. The
Supreme Court of the United States has also held
that the Federal Communications Commission is
vested with authority to regulate lotteries on radio
and television in the exercise of its power to grant
and renew broadcast licenses."'
' See Federal Communications Commn. v. Amer.
Broadcasting Co., 347 U. S.284 (1954).

Mr. Eagleton also indicated that even if federal
legislation had not comprehensively occupied the
field of radio and television regulation, "state
control of the content of programs would be an
unconstitutional interference with interstate commerce which under Article I, Section 8, Clause 3,
of the United States Constitution can be controlled
only by Congress. Clearly, one state may not
dictate the content of programs which by the very
nature of the air waves are being broadcast across
state lines into many other states. This is a subject
on which the Constitution requires uniform Congressional regulation for the protection of all the
states."
FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF CONTROL
Expanding on his first premise-that the federal
government has preempted the field of regulation
of radio and television-Mr. Eagleton stated:
"Justice Holmes... expressed the preemption
doctrine thus: 'When Congress has taken the particular subject matter in hand coincidence is as ineffective as opposition, and a state law is not to be
declared a help because it attempts to go farther
than Congress has seen fit to go.' 2 ...The test used
to determine federal preemption [is] whether the
'scheme of federal regulation' is 'so pervasive as to
make reasonable the inference that Congress left no
room for the States to supplement it.' 3 ... The use
of this test leaves little doubt that Congress intended its regulation of radio and television pro2
See Charleston & Western Carolina R. Co. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U. S. 597, 604 (1915).
3Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218,
230 (1947); Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U. S.497,
502 (1956).
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grams to be exclusive. The federal regulations expressly protect the public interest by covering
licensing of stations, censorship, equal use of
facilities by political opponents, obscenity and
lotteries .... "
Circuit Attorney Eagleton added that even if
the comprehensiveness of federal regulation were
not conclusive, "it would seem that the question of
complete federal preemption had been decided by
Congress in Section 301 of the Communications
Act of 1934 which provides that it is the purpose of
the Act, among other things, 'to maintain control
of the United States over all channels of interstate
and foreign radio transmission.' It is inconceivable
that [such] congressional intent... would be
effective with each of the states of the nation imposing its own local standards for the content of
broadcasts. Having relieved the states of authority
over broadcasting, Congress recognized its responsibility and expressly prohibited lotteries from
being broadcast by a uniform regulation to apply
throughout the nation."
Mr. Eagleton also pointed out that a number of
judicial decisions lend support to the position that
Congress has preempted the field of regulation of
broadcasting, noting in particular the Dumont
Laboratoriescase 4 which held that a state may not
censor films used in televising programs broadcast
in the state. "This situation," Mr. Eagleton noted,
"is closely analogous to a state attempt to regulate
the content of programs by enforcing its lottery
laws against television or radio stations."
BURDENING INTERSTATE

COMMERCE

The second ground for Mr. Eagleton's conclusion that states have no power to control the
content of programs broadcast by radio or television is based upon the constitutional power of the
federal government to control interstate commerce. Turning to this point, he stated: "The
Commerce Clause of the Constitution is recognized
as giving rise to the principle that no state may
burden interstate commerce even in the absence of
federal occupation of a field. 5 ... The need for
national uniformity in the regulation of radio and
television broadcasts is obvious in view of the
multiplicity of state laws, many of a conflicting
nature, which would burden the use of the air
4 Allan B. Dumont Laboratories v. Carroll, 184 F.2d 153 (3d Cir. 1950).
1 See Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U. S. 761,
779 (1945).
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waves in interstate communication. One state
from which programs originated could by the local
peculiarities either of its laws or of those who
interpret its laws arbitrarily decide the listening
habits of the entire country ....
Both the authorities6 and the obvious threat of chaos in multiple
regulations of interstate broadcast programs lead
to the necessary conclusion that state imposition of
program control by enforcement of lottery laws
would burden the interstate transmission of information which is commerce.... If present laws
are inadequate, Congress must supply the remedy.
If present enforcement is inadequate, the problem
is one for the Department of Justice and the
Federal Communication Commission."
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES*
Counsel Inadequate in Capital Case Because
State Bar Dues Were Unpaid-The defendant was
convicted of murder and sentenced to death for the
heineous killing of a child. On a petition for rehearing, he showed that his court-appointed
counsel had been delinquent in paying his state bar
association dues, and thus his name had been
stricken from the rolls of attorneys. This, the defendant claimed, disqualified the lawyer from
practice so that he had been denied his constitutional right to counsel. The Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals set the conviction aside on this
basis and held that the defendant had a right to a
qualified, practicing attorney. Martinez v. State,
318 S.W. 2d 66 (1958).
The court premised its argument on a state
statute and on both the state and federal constitutions, which require the appointment of counsel
in capital cases. This requirement, it said, meant a
duly qualified, practicing attorney, whereas here
the attorney appointed by the court to represent the
defendant was not at that time authorized to,
practice law in the state. The right of an accused to
counsel was considered a valuable right conferred
on individuals by society, and it was held error for
the trial court not to follow the mandatory provisions of the state statute which prohibited all
persons not members of the State Bar from prac6
Cases cited and discussed in Mr. Eagleton's report
are: Fisher's Blend Station v. State Tax Commn.,
297 U. S.650 (1936); Station WBT v. Poulnot, 46
F.2d 671 (E.D.S. Car. 1931); Whitehurst v. Grimes,
21 F.2d 787 (E.D. Ky. 1927).
* Prepared by Francis A. Heroux, Senior Law Student, Northwestern University School of Law.
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ticing law. The court concluded that any other
holding would nullify the entire State Bar Act.
The dissent questioned the true justice of the
majority holding, which set aside a conviction in a
capital case wholly without regard to the competency, experience, skill, and ability of the lawyer.
Furthermore, the defendant's counsel was actively
engaged in other cases and he had only to pay his
delinquent dues to have his name restored to the
roll of practicing attorneys.

Defendant In Court Must Be Informed Of His
Rights-The defendant was arrested for drying his
automobile while intoxicated. He was brought before a justice for a hearing on this charge; however,
the justice believed the defendant to be under the
influence of intoxicants and not in full possession
of his faculties. The defendant was committed to
the county jail, to remain there until he sobered up.
On the following day, he was brought before the
justice who advised him of his rights and the
nature of the crime, heard the case, and found him
guilty. On appeal, the defendant claimed he was
not immediately informed of his rights. The County
Court in the State of New York agreed and reversed the conviction and remitted the fine. The
court held that the justice was under a duty to immediately inform the defendant of the charge
against him and of his right to counsel, even though
the instructions would be useless because the defendant was intoxicated. People v. Wright, 178
N.Y.S. 2d 535 (1958). The court stated that although it might seem that a justice should not
accept a plea from a defendant who is intoxicated,
and that instructions regarding such a plea and the
effect thereof would be futile, the state statute was
quite explicit upon the point; so that when a defendant is brought before a magistrate he must be
"immediately" informed of the charge and of his
right to counsel. These rights were considered
substantial and not subject to omission irrespective
of whether or not the defendant was in a condition
or state of mind to actually comprehend what the
court says.
Attorney General's Right To Defend State
Trooper-A state trooper was charged with
driving at a speed greater than was reasonable.
The prosecution was privately instituted and privately conducted. At the trial, the attorney general

of the state appeared as counsel for the defense and
the individual prosecuting the suit immediately
moved to strike the attorney general's appearance.
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire denied the
motion, holding that it was a proper exercise of the
attorney general's discretion to appear as counsel
for the state trooper. State v. Swift, 143 A. 2d 114
(1958).
In reaching its conclusion, the court stated that
the powers of the attorney general in New Hampshire are broad and numerous. He must supervise
all criminal causes pending before the state courts,
and he must represent the state in causes in which
the state is interested. These duties include the
descretionary right to dismiss any pending cause
upon the entry of a nolle prosequi. Concommitant
with his power to dismiss a suit is the right to
decide, as in this case, that the exoneration of an
official by public trial is in the public interest. If
this is so, there can be no reason to question his
authority to appear for the state trooper, because
the officer is an official of the state.
Tape-Recording Of Testimony Given To Grand
jury Is Permisslble-A recording machine was
used to record the testimony given by witnesses
at a grand jury hearing. Thereafter, the defendant
was indicted, but he moved to set the indictment
aside on the grounds that the use of the recorder
was improper. The Kentucky Court of Appeals
allowed the indictment to stand, holding that the
recording of grand jury testimony was not prohibited by statute and, since the defendant was not
prejudiced by the recording, he could not complain.
Greenwallv. Commonwealth, 317 S.W. 2d 859 (Ky.
1958).
A Kentucky statute provides that only members
of the grand jury can be present during its deliberation or voting. This is for the purpose, of course, of
shielding the grand jury proceedings from public
scrutiny. The court construed this objective rather
narrowly, however, and stated that the recording of
witness testimony before the deliberations is not
within the ban of the statute.
While upholding the tape recording, the court
elicited a strong caveat for its future use. It said
that the use of a recording device in a grand jury
inquiry is an unorthodox practice and is not to be
commended, because there is a risk of unauthorized
disclosure and embarrassment. Furthermore, there
are many situations in which the use of the re-
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cording would be unfair to the defendant and would
substantially prejudice his rights,
One judge dissented, because he claimed that
there was no statutory authorization for the use of
the device. Furthermore, he expressed anxiety over
the possibility that this holding might open the
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door to other new devices. "The next innovation,"
he said, "will be a motion picture camera with a
sound attachment-or maybe even television."
(For other recent case abstracts see pp. 568 and
621)

NOTES
The Association's next annual meeting will be in
Milwaukee, Wisconsin during the three day period
of July 30, 31 and August 1, 1959. On the following
Monday, August 3rd, in nearby Chicago, Northwestern University School of Law will begin its
five-day Short Course for Prosecuting Attorneys.
Four full tuition scholarships have been made
available to our Association for award to its members. The selection of recipients will be based upon
(a) the member's interest and activity in the

Association and (b) financial need for such assistance as, for instance, where the county he
represents cannot or will not defray the cost of his
attending the course. Any member interested in
applying for one of these four tuition scholarships
should write to the Association's Chairman of the
Scholarship selection committee: John G. McCutcheon, Prosecuting Attorney, Pierce County,
305 Courthouse, Tacoma, Washington.

